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Abstract
The main sources for the discussion of the category “relation” were Aristotle’s Categories 
and Metaphysics. Before their translation into Arabic in the 8th and 9th centuries, Christian 
theologians and in their footsteps Syriac scholars considered Aristotle’s works to be a useful 
tool in Christological discussions. This article analyzes the category of relation and its deve-
lopment in Arabic-Islamic philosophy in authors such as Kindī and his student Aḥmad Ibn 
aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Saraḫsī, Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ghazālī, Ibn Rušd, the Sufi Ibn ʿArabī and others.
Keywords: relation as dynamic principle; Aristotle; Alexandrian commentaries; Stoa; Neo-
platonism; Arabic-Islamic authors; Epistles of the Sincere Brethren; Ramon Llull
Resum. La categoria de la relació en la filosofia araboislàmica
Les principals fonts de discussió sobre la categoria de la «relació» foren les Categories i la 
Metafísica d’Aristòtil. Abans de ser traduïdes a l’àrab durant els segles viii i ix, els teòlegs 
cristians i els seus seguidors siris consideraren que les obres d’Aristòtil constituïen un 
instrument útil en les discussions cristològiques. Aquest article analitza la categoria de la 
relació i el seu desenvolupament en la filosofia araboislàmica en autors com Kindī i el seu 
deixeble Aḥmad Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Saraḫsī, Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā, Ghazālī, Ibn Rušd i el sufí Ibn 
ʿArabī, entre d’altres.
Paraules clau: relació com a principi dinàmic; Aristòtil; comentaris alexandrins; Stoa; 
neoplatonisme; autors araboislàmics; Epístoles dels Germans de la Puresa; Ramon Llull
Since the 19th century, Aristotle’s category of relation has been brought into 
the focus of attention by linguistic philosophers and logicians. A survey of the 
discussions in Islamic philosophy will be interesting, because they mirror 
aspects which reappear in medieval and modern thought with modifications 
or aspects which are taken up in a selective manner with some updating and 
new accentuations. 
 Reception date: 4-10-2017 
Acceptance date: 16-4-2018
92  Enrahonar 61, 2018 Hans Daiber
Aristotle’s Categories (ch. 7) and his Metaphysics (V ch. 15. 1020b26-
1021b10) were the main sources for discussions about relation. The first trans-
mitters in pre-Islamic times were Syriac scholars. Their motivation for the study 
of Aristotle’s Organon, including the Categories, was the Christian theology of 
trinity, in addition to the use of dialectic in Christological discussions and later 
in the dialogue with Islam1. Already Augustine in his work De trinitate betrays 
knowledge of Aristotle’s Categories, including the chapter on relation. 
With this background, the chapter on relation in the Syriac commentaries 
on Aristotle’s Categories deserves our interest. We take as an example the dis-
cussion of the relatives in a Treatise on the Categories of Aristotle, the Philosopher, 
written by Sergius of Reshʿaynā’ in the 5th/6th century. As in Aristotle, the 
related subject determines the relation and not conversely. Sergius mentions 
the same examples as Aristotle and adds some more from the Aristotelian 
commentaries, mostly Ammonius and Philoponus2.
After the rise of Islam, Christian theologians became transmitters of Greek 
texts and thought. They took over the logical curriculum of Alexandrian phi-
losophers in a shortening version, which included Porphyry’s Isagoge, Aristot-
le’s Categories, De interpretatione and Analytica priora, the latter mostly only 
until book I 7.
The earliest example in Arabic of this version is a paraphrase, written in 
the 8th century and attributed to Muḥammad Ibn ʿAbdallāh Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ, a 
famous prose-writer. He might have improved on an earlier revised Arabic 
translation of a Syriac handbook on Aristotle’s Organon. 
The text3 criticizes Aristotle, claiming that he was not able to give a clear 
definition of relation. The author furthermore explains that the so-called “fun-
damental” of “the substance” precedes “the relative”, also called “the derivative” 
(al-farʿ). He says that the “fundamental” of “the substance” determines “the 
relation”; and he adds that the relatives are “homonyma”, if they have identi-
cal names and the same identities, like “humanness” – we can add: if they 
correlate or if there is a symmetrical relation; otherwise, they are “heteronyma”.
The text attributed to Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ scarcely had any echo in later phil-
osophical literature. 
We can assume that before the Arabic translation of the Categories by Isḥāq 
Ibn Ḥunain4 (died 910/1 A.D.) there were more channels of transmission. A 
slightly expanded paraphrase of the Categories is excerpted in the Book of 
Stones attributed to Ǧābir Ibn Ḥayyān and perhaps written “decades after 800 
A.D.”. At the end of the chapter on quality we find a remarkable modifica-
tion of Aristotle’s doctrine: only genera and not particulars can be relatives 
and knowledge is related to the known, not to particular knowledge. The 
1. Cf. Daiber (2001: 327-345).
2. Ed and transl. by Aydin (2016: 145-149 = §§ 74-79).
3. Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ (1978: 16-17).
4. Ed. ʿAbdarraḥmān Badawī, cf. Aristotle (1980: 21-76).
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Ǧābir-text identifies the genera with “universals” (kulliyya) in contrast to the 
particulars5.
In a similar manner and presumably during the same period, perhaps in 
the first half of the 9th century, the first great Islamic philosopher, al-Kindī, 
declared the relative to be something “existing without matter”. He counted 
it among the “connected predicates of the substance”, and argued that “father-
hood and sonship result from the relation between the one and the other, 
from the existence of the one through the other, (just) like the part (exists) 
through the whole. Both are thus in their characterization not connected 
with matter”6. Kindī and the paraphrase of the Aristotelian text in Ǧābir 
follow the Alexandrian tradition in their specifications and deviations, as parallels 
in the commentaries by Olympiodorus, Elias and Simplicius show. These com-
mentators consider categories in singular cases as something in the mind.
Kindī’s distinction between simple and connected “predicates of substanc-
es” is a part of the Alexandrian division between simple and connected cate-
gories. The Alexandrians differ from Aristotle, who regarded the ten categories 
– namely “substance”, “quantity”, “quality”, “relation”, “where”, “when”, “posi-
tion”, “possession”, “action” and “passion” – as something existing absolutely. 
Only the first four categories, “substance”, “quantity”, “quality” and “relation”, 
were considered by the Alexandrians as something “simple” (ἁπλαῖ), and the 
remaining six as “connected” (σύνθετοι). Interestingly, this division of the cat-
egories reappears in a short summary of the categories by Kindī’s student 
Aḥmad Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib as-Saraḫsī (died 286/899), which until now was assumed 
to be lost7.
Like his teacher Kindī, Saraḫsī was engaged in disputes with Christians and 
could use his knowledge of the Aristotelian Organon in his arguments against 
the Christians, especially against the doctrine of the trinity.
The method to use Greek logic against Christian doctrine and belief con-
tinued to be a standard in the 10th century – despite some dispute between 
Christian and Muslim scholars about the value of logic. I refer to the discussion 
in 932 A.D. between the Nestorian Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus and the Muslim 
scholar Abū Saʿīd as-Sīrāfī. According to the Christian Abū Bišr, logic is a 
universal valid vehicle of intelligible things for all nations and superior to 
languages, which differ among the people and require logic in their grammar. 
The Muslim as-Sīrāfī, however, defends language as the only access to intelli-
gible things; against Hellenism he propagates “clear Arabic language” as 
revealed by God in the Qur’ān8. 
This reminds us of the Andalusian scholar Ibn Ḥazm in the 10th/11th cen-
tury9. His logical work at-Taqrīb li-ḥadd al-manṭiq, “An approach to the defi-
5. Ed. Nomanul Haq (1994: 30,1-33, ult.; partly translated 230-242).
6. Kindī (1978: 370,14-371,3; in English translation 2012, 285).
7. Saraḫsī, Muḫtaṣar (Iḫtiṣār) Kitāb Qāṭīġūriyās, ms. Aya Sofya 4855 (copied 733/1333), 
fol. 71r, 1-9.
8. Cf. Adamson and Key (2015).
9. Cf. Ramón Guerrero (2013: 413f.); Lameer (2013: 421-426).
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nition of logic”, is written as a methodological introduction to his theology 
and his refutation of Christianity. As in his critique of Kindī’s metaphysics, 
which is mainly based on the Neoplatonism of Proclus, in his refutation of 
Christianity Ibn Ḥazm propagates a strict concept of God’s transcendence, 
of God’s tawḥīd.
Here, Aristotle’s concept of relation in his Categories becomes fundamen-
tally important. Ibn Ḥazm mentions relation as one of the “four fundamentals”, 
“substance”, “quantity”, “quality” and “relation”, which in accordance with the 
Alexandrian and Kindian tradition appear as “simple” categories and can be 
“connected” with the categories “when”, “where”, “position”, “possession”, 
“active” and “passive”. According to Ibn Ḥazm, God’s names, his attributes, 
must be understood correctly as categories without relation to the created, as 
this would contradict God’s transcendence.
Ibn Ḥazm was aware of the existence of an asymmetrical relation between 
God and creation. God’s acting, hearing, seeing and living, as mentioned in 
the Qur’ān, do not require a correlative. These attributes are proper names 
of the creator, who is neither genus nor species nor bearer of accidents. Thus, 
the creator cannot be called one of the simple or connected categories. The 
expression “God is acting” has the meaning that the predicate “is acting” has 
a relation to God – not because God is a substance and has the accident “act-
ing”. Simultaneously, God’s acting does not require an object. God’s independ-
ence, his autarkeia, became a first step in a deviation from the concept of a 
substance. God is not a substance with accidents, to which God’s creation is 
“related” (muḍāf), because of the accidents of this substance.
Ibn Ḥazm combines his concept of logic as a tool for everyone with his ideal 
of striving after knowledge by everyone, as far as he has the capacity.
Here, it is helpful to draw attention to an encyclopedia, compiled shortly 
before Ibn Ḥazm in scholarly circles of Iraq, the so-called Epistles of the Sincere 
Brethren. In this work, logic10 is considered as the best way to truth, to God, 
a tool to help men to imitate God. Like the Alexandrians, the Epistles classified 
logic as “mental logic” or “mental concepts” or “forms”. Following Neoplaton-
ic philosophy, the Epistles let them emanate from God into the Active Intellect, 
then into the Universal Soul, into prime matter and finally into the human 
soul. Consequently, any spoken language, the linguistic logic, mirrors this 
mental logic, a higher reality. 
The texts which we have discussed so far mirror the Aristotelian concept 
of categories and Aristotle’s explanation of the category “relation”, often shaped 
by the Alexandrian commentators and increasingly by Neoplatonic philosophy 
about God’s transcendence and the emanations. This is the background for 
new accentuations after the first great philosopher Kindī, namely in Fārabī, Ibn 
Sīnā and Ibn Rušd. 
An interesting constituent of this background, and an epigone of the Aris-
totelian-Alexandrian tradition at the turn from the 10th to the 11th century, is 
10. Edited and translated by Baffioni (2010).
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the Nestorian Christian Abū l-Faraǧ Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib in Baghdad11. According to 
him relativa, which are “distant from each other”, can only be “understood” 
by analogy. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib discusses the question: How can the form of a sub-
stance be part and not accident of what is composed of form and matter? He 
assumes an interdependence of form, matter and accident and illustrates this 
with the example of the aroma or smell of an apple, which according to him 
shapes the surrounding air, and the form of this shaped air will be imprinted 
on our senses. Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib declares the imprint of the air on the senses to be 
a “spiritual” (rūḥānī) imprint, different from the “bodily” (ǧusmānī) imprint 
of the form on the matter. 
This reminds us of the Stoic discussion of relation and its transcendental 
aspects12. Its echo in Neoplatonic philosophy became influential in the 10th 
century, in the Epistles of the “Brethren of Purity” and their classification of 
the intellect as mediator between God and human soul. The Stoics had detect-
ed the relation as a universally valid category, in which all single entities are 
connected in the totality of all things. Their concept of the immanence of the 
pneuma, the divine dynamic and continuous medium, is mirrored in the Stoic 
doctrine of the interpenetration of all substances, of the total mixture of mat-
ter and pneuma. This interpenetration of all substances became important for 
the Stoic theory of the relations of place, time and movement, as well as action 
and passion. Because of their universality, these relations were considered as 
primary structures, which were the object of the thought and perceivable in a 
dynamic and time-related process of realization, the physis in the relatives, the 
secondary things. In this theory of relation, the relation appears to be the form, 
the primary structure of different relata, which correspond to this form.
Traces of this Stoic concept of relation entered Islamic philosophy, namely 
through the mediation of Neoplatonism, in which the Stoic immanence of the 
divine dynamic medium, the pneuma, is replaced by a concept of the divine 
One, who as divine intellect is immanent and transcendent. Here, two aspects 
become important in the Islamic period: the role of reason and intellect in the 
reflection on the category of relation and the emanation of the divine intellect 
determining the concept of relation created in the human soul. We mentioned 
Ibn Ḥazm, the “Brethren of Purity” and Ibn aṭ-Ṭayyib, who possibly were 
inspired by some Alexandrian Neoplatonizing commentators of Aristotle. 
Now we shall consider the place of Fārābī, Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rušd between 
philosophical linguistic and metaphysical interpretation of the relation. 
Fārābī (872-950/1 A.D.), called “the second teacher” (after Aristotle), pre-
sents — in his “Book on the Categories”,13 in the chapter on the relatives — 
the aspects of time and place, which were discussed by Aristotle separately in 
different places. Fārābī studied them as something referring to relation. He 
11. Edition and analysis by Ferrari (2006: 251-300; analysis 81-95).
12. Löbl (1986).
13. Edition and translation by Dunlop (1957/1959). Arabic text ed. Rafīq al-ʿAǧam (1985) and 
ed. M.T. Dānišpažūh (1987).
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adds that not everything which has a kind of connection with something else 
can be classified as “relation”. Fārābī assumes “particles of connections”, which 
are “employed in relating each one (of the relatives) to the other”. He mentions 
the condition that “essence” (māhiya) and “existence” (wuǧūd) of the correlat-
ed things “have a certain kind of relation”. In addition, in the description 
(yūṣafu) of the relation, the names should indicate the “essence” and “existence” 
of both relatives. Fārābī adds chapters on the peculiarities of the relation, which 
should avoid confusion about the relation between two things.
 With this background, we can look at the section on relation in Fārābī’s 
Book of Letters14.
The text allows the following observations:
1. The examples, which were used by Fārābī, were taken from Aristotle, the 
Alexandrians and from Ibn al-Muqaffaʿ.
2. Fārābī introduced three factors, selected from Aristotle, which according 
to him can only determine a relation, namely time, place and possession. 
3. Farabi introduced the “particles of relation”, i.e. prepositions like “in”, as an 
additional indication of a real relation. In the example “Zayd in the house”, 
the relation between “Zayd” and “house” is described as “surrounding”.
Here, Fārābī defined relation as a “way” (ṭarīq) between two outermost 
points; in the case of the roof of a house, built on the ground, Fārābī speaks of 
“descent” from the roof and ascent from the earth. Similarly, in the example 
“Zayd in the house”, the relation appears to be determined by the state of 
“surrounding” and not by the relatives and their essences.
Fārābī’s discussion of relation bears witness to his endevaour to give a 
clear definition of relation and relative and the names used for both.
At the same time, Fārābī seems to be aware that the meaning of an expres-
sion is also “something that is in the mind of the listener” and that expressions 
might be used in an arbitrary way. The category “relation” with the aspects 
of place, time and possession, and its classification as a state between two 
outermost points, evolves to be an essential element in Fārābī’s theory of 
communication.15 
He presupposes a concept of language, which becomes clear in his discus-
sion of relation: language is conditional on descriptions and definitions, which 
are the constituents of relations between relatives; relations are correlated to 
time, place and possession; their linguistic tool are the so-called “particles” 
(ḥurūf), e.g. the preposition “in”, which in this case are not restricted to a 
grammatical function. They have mainly a logical function and simultane-
ously they create the context for descriptions and definitions and for the 
correct understanding of the meaning of “expressions” (alfāẓ) and thereby for 
communication.
14. Fārābī (1970: 85-91).
15. Diebler (2005: 286-290).
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Thus, Fārābī gives a clear indication of his own standpoint in the discussion 
between Abū Bišr Mattā Ibn Yūnus, a defender of logic as a universal valid 
vehicle of intelligible things, and the grammarian Abū Saʿīd as-Sīrāfī, a defend-
er of language as only access to intelligible things. Fārābī favors exact descrip-
tions and definitions in the use of categories (including relation, time, place 
and possession). According to him, there is an interdependency between the 
sensible objects, our statements and our thinking, the “intelligible”. 
Fārābī and the discussions in his time about the relation of grammar and 
logic prepared the basis for the concept of a “mental logic” (al-manṭiq al-fikrī), 
mirrored in any language, as formulated in the Epistles of the “Brethren of 
Purity”. Moreover, reason and intellect begin to rank high in the reflection on 
the category of relation, as we saw in Ibn Ḥazm.
Now, we turn to Ibn Sīnā (980-1037 A.D.). He was acquainted with 
Fārābī’s thought, but he had different accentuations. He devoted a separate 
discussion to the Categories in his encyclopedia aš-Šifā’, “The Healing”16. In 
his earlier written “Middle Compendium on Logic”,17 Ibn Sīnā mainly follows 
the contents of Aristotle, including moderate criticisms directed against certain 
traditions of Aristotle’s commentators, esp. Simplicius. At the end of the short 
section on the relative, he lists the 10 categories substance, quantity, quality, 
relative, where, when, position, possession, action and passion. He adds that 
the relative, according to its nature, concerns all of them. In his aš-Šifā’, Ibn 
Sīnā contrasts the category substance with the accidental categories, which are 
divided into quantity and quality on the one hand and relative, where, when, 
action, passion, position and possession on the other. The category of relatives 
is related to the intrinsic nature of the subject, and the six remaining categories 
where, when, position, possession, action and passion to something extrinsic. 
Ibn Sīnā discusses the relationship between a man in the house and this house: 
he argues that an additional word between “man” and “the house”, namely “the 
owner of”, creates a relationship between “man” and “house”. Here, the “intrin-
sic nature” of the subject “man/owner” points at the same time to something 
extrinsic, the “house”. 
Fārābī already discussed this example: he used grammar and additional 
particles and distinguished between ‘the house owned by Zayd’ and ‘the house 
surrounding Zayd’ (= Zayd in the house). However, in Fārābī, the relationship 
is neither something intrinsic to the inhabitant of the house nor something 
extrinsic depending on the house. It is something, the expression of which is 
tolerated, “relying on what is in the mind (ḍamīr) of the listener and relying 
on (the fact), that only the possession (of the house by Zayd)” (or Zayd’s hab-
itation in the house) “can be understood from it”.
Here, we see a shift from the linguistic and logical level to the ontological. 
This ontological level is further developed in Ibn Sīnā’s encyclopedia “The 
16. Ibn Sīnā (1959), aš-Šifāʾ, al-Manṭiq, II: al-maqūlāt.
17. Ed. Kalbarczyk (2012). Cf. Eichner (2013).
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Healing”, in particular in the book on Metaphysics, in a chapter on relatives18. 
This is an elaboration of Aristotle, Metaphysics V 15. Ibn Sīnā declares the rela-
tion (iḍāfa) to be based on some “notion” (maʿnā) in one of the two relatives 
(muḍāfāt), e.g. in the asymmetrical relation father-son only the father has the 
relation fatherhood, which Ibn Sīnā called “notion” or “description of its exist-
ence” (waṣf wuǧūdihī), of its “being with respect to something else in the father”. 
Because of this “description”, the relative has its external existence. The “defi-
nition” (ḥadd) of the relative “in its existence” (fī l-wuǧūd) makes the relative 
an accident, “which has the mentioned description (i.e. fatherhood), when it 
is apprehended (ʿuqila) in the intellect”.
Consequently, Ibn Sīnā distinguished between “intellectual relation” (al-iḍā-
fa al-ʿaqliyya) and “existential relation” (al-iḍāfa al-wuǧūdiyya).
Ibn Sīnā classifies the relation between father and son as pertaining to 
action and passion. Both are categories referring to relation. Action and passion 
are an alternative rendering of cause and effect; causality appears as relation, 
also as God-world relationship. Here, Ibn Sīnā is followed by al-Ghazālī19. This 
is an elaboration of Aristotle’s denial of an infinite chain of causes in favor of 
the first unmoved mover, by integrating the Neoplatonic doctrine of a 
transcendent God and of intermediate causes, emanating from the divine First 
Cause. Simultaneously, the intermediate causes are ontologically inferior to the 
divine First Cause. 
Here, relation is a causal relation between the divine necessarily existing 
One, and the multiplicity of the caused, of existing matter. This multiplicity 
can be interpreted as something determined by the categories, which shape the 
accidents of the substance. 
After Ibn Sīnā, the Andalusian philosopher Ibn Rušd/Averroes (1126-1198 
A.D.) kept to the Neoplatonic background and the ontological interpretation, 
combined with the Farabian-Avicennian logic of relation. Simultaneously, Ibn 
Rušd deviated from Ibn Sīnā in an interesting return to Aristotle. Like Aristot-
le, he concentrated on the relata, the fundaments of any relation. 
In his monograph on metaphysics, called Epitome of Aristotle’s Metaphysics20, 
the category “substance” is extensively discussed by Ibn Rušd, because it is the 
only category that can essentially become a relative, e.g. “fatherhood and son-
ship” (al-abūwa wa l-banūwa)”. 
However, Ibn Rušd did not confine himself to a substance-orientated con-
cept of relation. He reveals indications of a new evaluation of relation. He says, 
with regard to Aristotle’s simultaneousness of two correlatives, that “both are 
simultaneous in being and in knowledge”; he argues that the category of rela-
tion “is something the soul introduces into the existents”, and he adds that 
through this relationship the two subjects of the correlated things can be con-
18. Ed. and translated by Michael E. Marmura, in Ibn Sīnā (2005: 116-123).
19. Lizzini (2013: 165-196).
20. Ibn Rušd (1958); transl. Rüdiger Arnzen (2010). This work was the basis for Salvador 
Gómez Nogales (1976: 302-305), supplemented by other texts. 
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ceptualized (taṣawwur) and, vice versa, the relationship of the two subjects can 
be conceptualized. The conceptualization is dependent on the soul. 
This is further explained in Ibn Rušd’s Tahāfut at-Tahāfut, “The Incoher-
ence of the Incoherence”, in a critique of Ghazālī’s statement that “the rela-
tion and two relative things form a plurality of knowledge, and that for 
instance our knowledge of fatherhood is different from our knowledge of the 
father and the son”21.
According to Ghazālī22, there are three kinds of knowledge: knowledge of 
the essence (ḏāt) of the father, knowledge of the son and knowledge of the 
relation, which is enclosed (muḍamman) in the two preceding kinds of knowl-
edge; they “condition each other”. Ghazālī explains this with the divine “First” 
knowing Himself and the “individual genera” to which He has a relation as 
their “Principle”. “Otherwise, the relation’s being known to Him becomes 
unintelligible”. Ghazālī’s statement is remarkable for several reasons:
1. He considers relation as causal connection between two relatives.
2. Relation is part of an epistemological process; knowledge is the bridge 
between two relatives.
3. The example of the divine “principle” illustrates the causal relation between 
knower and known, and also between cause and effect.
4. Aristotle’s classification of “knowledge” (ἐπιστήμη) as a relative — because 
knowledge and knowable things condition each other — appears to tend 
to a new evaluation of relation and the relative, which is already alluded to 
in Aristotle’s statement “and if those things are relatives for which being is 
the same as being somehow related to something, then perhaps some answer 
may be found”. Ghazālī did not develop this to a new concept of relation, 
but added to this the concept of knowledge as connecting relation.
In his critique of Ghazālī’s Incoherence of the philosophers, Ibn Rušd did not 
realize the subtleties of Ghazālī’s remarks and denied Ghazālī’s epistemological 
aspects. Instead, he says: “Now, the truth is, that the relation is an attribute 
additional to two correlated things, from outside the soul and in the existents. 
However, the relation in the concepts (al-maʿqūlāt) is rather a state (ḥāl) than 
an attribute (ṣifa) additional to two correlated things”. The following passage 
can be interpreted as an indication of the inexplicability of this state of father-
hood, the human knowledge (al-ʿilm al-insānī) of which cannot reach the stage 
of divine eternal knowledge (al-ʿilm al-azalī) “from the visible to the invisible” 
(min aš-šāhid ilā l-ġā’ib)23. 
To human knowledge only those existents which share the same genus or 
species are accessible. Ibn Rušd´s declaration is, as in Ibn Sīnā, based on the 
Neoplatonic doctrine of the First Intellect, which “is pure act and cause. 
21. Ibn Rušd (1987: 350; transl. van den Bergh, I, 211).
22. Ghazālī (2000: 105, 9-12).
23. Ibn Rušd (1987: 351, 1-4; transl. van den Bergh, I, 211).
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(God’s) knowledge cannot be compared to human knowledge”. In accordance 
with the Neoplatonic system of emanations in gradations and because of the 
assumed dissimilarity between cause and effect, the epistemological conse-
quence for the human conceptualization of relationship can be summarized 
as follows:
1. As the subject of human conceptualization (taṣawwur) “consists of materi-
al things (al-umūr al-hayūlāniyya) only”, human concepts of relation are 
restricted to the substances and its accidents, the categories quantity, qual-
ity, relation, where, when, position, possession, action and passion.
2. The process of conceptualization is affected by the soul.
3. The imperfectness of this conceptualization is an echo of the indetermi-
nateness of the relation between the relatives.
4. In Ibn Rušd, the Neoplatonic concept of indeterminate relation appears to 
be connected to the concept of potentiality as “a disposition (istiʿdād) in a 
thing and (as) its inherent possibility (imkān) of existing in actuality”.
5. The indeterminateness of relation and its correlation with the concept of 
potentiality is not developed to a clear concept of a dynamic process 
between relation, relatives and linguistic conceptualization.
In Ibn Rušd, relation appears to be something accidental to the substance 
and simultaneously something essential.
This ambivalence and the Neoplatonic background, which Ibn Rušd 
shares with Ibn Sina, have parallels in the younger contemporary Ibn ʿArabī, 
a Sufi born in Murcia in 1165 A.D. (died 1240 in Damascus) and a repre-
sentative of a trend introducing philosophical elements in Sufism into the 
footsteps of Ghazālī, his great ideal. Ibn ʿArabī is perhaps inspired by Ibn 
Rušd’s and Ibn Sīnā’s concept of categories and their Neoplatonic idea of the 
emanational connection between the divine absolute being and the world of 
creation. This would explain why Ibn ʿArabī24 related the ten divine aspects 
of the “Creator” to the ten Aristotelian categories applicable to “every order 
in the world”, namely his “essence” to the “substance of the world”, his 
“attributes” to the “accidents”, his “eternity” to the “time”, his “sitting on the 
throne” to the “place”, his “names” to the “quantity”, his “assent” and “indig-
nation” to the “quality”, his “word” to the “position”, his “lordship” to the 
“relation”, his “creating” to the “active”, and his “response” to man’s prayers 
to the “passive”.
Moreover, this would explain why Ibn Arabī describes the bridge between 
God and the world with the Sufi term at-tanaffus ar-raḥmānī (or nafas 
ar-raḥmān) “the breath of compassion”, which became a vehicle for God’s 
words, his creatures. Within the Sufi concept of an identity of the all-perme-
ating infinite divine power and infinite divine acting, we find the category of 
24. Ibn ʿArabī (1968: II, 304,14-18; 211, 29-33) and on the equation with the divine aspects 
p. 435, 8-11. On the reception of the Aristotelian categories in Ibn Arabī cf. Gril (2005).
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relation of God’s sovereignty to the world and the category of “passion” (an 
yanfaʿila) of God, who answers (al-muǧīb) man’s prayer of request.
Ibn ʿArabī’s integration of the categories in a Stoic-Neoplatonic concept of 
an emanational connection between the divine absolute being and the world 
of creation through the all-permeating divine power transformed relation into 
a dynamic process, in which the infinite is procreated from the One.
Thus, Ibn ʿArabī gave his own answer in contemporary discussions about 
the question, whether and how the divine One creates multiplicity. Ibn Sīnā 
and Ibn Rušd and in their footsteps medieval philosophers25 defended the 
principle “Ex Uno, secundum quod unum, non nisi unum”. Ibn ʿArabī expres-
sis verbis denies this dictum, which he attributes to al-ḥakīm “the philosopher”.
A younger contemporary of Ibn ʿArabī, the Sufi philosopher Ibn Sabʿīn 
(ca. 1217-1270 A.D.), appears to have disagreed with the position of Ibn 
ʿArabī. In his philosophical work Budd al-ʿārif wa-ʿaqīdat al-muḥaqqiq, “The 
escape of the knower and the belief of the seeker of truth”26, he compares 
relation with the relation between knowledge and known or perceived: they 
are imperfect because of their multiplicity; they oppose the “supreme (divine) 
attributes” and the “unity of the (divine) attributes”. Ibn Sabʿīn remarks: 
“strictly speaking from relation only imagination (wahm) remains, which van-
ishes”. Apparently, Ibn Sabʿīn criticized the use of the categories in Sufi theol-
ogy, especially the category relation as something ending in “imagination”. 
Their use implies multiplicity and affects God’s unity. It might be a critical 
allusion to the school of Ibn ʿArabī and his model al-Ghazālī to which he pre-
fers the position of Ibn Sīnā or Ibn Rušd.
It is interesting to observe that Ibn Sabʿīn’s critical view of the categories is 
not shared by his younger contemporary Ramon Llull (1232-1315 A.D.). This 
Majorcan philosopher and mystic had knowledge of the Aristotelian Organon, 
of Ghazālī’s Maqāṣid al-falāsifa and of other Arabic sources, including possibly 
Ibn Sabʿīn. But his knowledge of Ibn Sabʿīn must be denied with regard to 
Llull’s concept of the categories, especially of relation. On the contrary, we 
detect parallels with the Sufi philosopher Ibn ʿArabī. We can contrast Ibn 
ʿArabī’s category (1) “substance” as being “creator” or divine “essence”, (2) 
“relation” as being divine “lordship” and (3) “action” as being act of “creating” 
with Llull’s concept of relatio substantialis27: Llull gives as an example the sub-
stantial relation in God existing between Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Here-
with, in created things the relation corresponds, namely between form and 
matter. This relation as being form indicates multiplicity, “like the multiplicity 
(pluralitas) between father and son, between preceding (antecedens) and fol-
lowing (consequens)”. Relation is a “coessential” (coessentiale) (real) relative, 
something that coessentially can have a relation (referibile) and (coessentially) 
is the act of relation (referre). Relation is a basic principle (principium primiti-
25. Cf. Teske (1993).
26. Ibn Sabʿīn (1978: 71f ). 
27. Ramon Llull (1985: 108, 110, 112 and 114). Cf. Johnston (1987: 62-73).
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vum) and like substance it can have coessential principles, like action and 
passion or quantity (maioritas, minoritas) and quality. Relation can be an acci-
dent, inferior to the substantial relation. It is a cause of accidental or substan-
tial action (actio) and passion (passio). These few selected descriptions clearly 
reveal the new evaluation of relation, which in contrast to Aristotle no longer 
concentrates on relation as something dependent upon the substance. 
With the Neoplatonizing Islamic philosophers – including the Sufi philos-
opher Ibn ʿArabī – Ramon Llull shares the classification of relation as a dynam-
ic and active principle and with Ibn ʿArabī he shares the use of the categories 
as universal forms with a “naturally physical and metaphysical status”.
Ibn ʿArabī developed a concept of categories as something applicable to the 
order of the world and as something mirrored in the divine aspects of the Crea-
tor. Remarkably, Ibn ʿArabī’s divine categories “substance” = Creator, “relation” 
= God’s “Lordship” and “acting” = God’s act of creating, can be paralleled with 
Llull’s Trinitarian concept of the substantial relation, existing in God, between 
Father, Son and Holy Ghost. In addition, Ibn ʿArabī’s divine categories can be 
paralleled with Llull’s concept of the correlatives, in which the divine attributes 
appear in a correlation of acting – this is in Ibn ʿArabī God’s act of creating. 
Active – this is in Ibn ʿArabī God as creator, a substance. Passive – this is in 
Ibn ʿArabī God’s “Lordship”, a relation. 
From this correlation results the correlation of the divine act of intellegere, 
the divine intellectus intelligens and the divine objectum intellectum. 
We will not enter into more details, but it is clear that Llull did not follow 
the alleged Avicennian and the Averroistic thesis of “ex Uno, secundum quod 
unum, non nisi unum”. Similarly to Ibn ʿArabī, he developed a relationship 
between God and his creation, in which the category relation received a new 
orientation. In this concept of relation, cause, effect and causing are correlated 
and relation is a dynamic process between substance, relative and relatum. Its 
integration in Llull’s Christian Trinitarian theology, in which the created world 
is an image of the divine Trinity, offers an interesting alternative to the Augus-
tinian Trinitarian theology. The rehabilitation of relation from John Scottus 
Eriugena (c. 801-c. 877 A.D.) until Bonaventura and (in an inconsistent man-
ner) Thomas Aquinas in the 13th century culminated in new accentuations of 
Ramon Llull, developed under the impression of Stoic-Neoplatonizing Islam-
ic philosophers, especially of the Sufi Ibn ʿArabī. Llull’s discussion of relation28 
forms an essential part of his contribution to logic, which recently has been 
said to be a “dynamization of logical predicates”29.
28. Platzeck (1963) and (1964-1965: 73-81).
29. Fidora (2007: 86). 
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